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THE WAR ON TERROR: WHERE WE HAVE BEEN, ARE,
AND SHOULD BE GOING
DAVID ARONOFSKY'
It is with pleasure and gratitude that I write this Chapter to honor
Professor Ved Nanda and the Denver Journal of International Law and
Policy ("Journal") in commemoration of the Journal's 40th Anniversary.
Before getting to know Professor Nanda as a friend and colleague, I
long admired his work and insight into the crucial international law
issues of the day while using his ideas in my own teaching. I have
participated in several Sutton Colloquium programs since first meeting
Professor Nanda in Montana, and always welcome these opportunities
to come to the University of Denver to share thoughts. I also greatly
appreciate the Journal's willingness to publish several of my past
writings. I have chosen one of these writings here, co-authored with
Matt Cooper who is one of Professor Nanda's very best international
law students among the many he has taught and inspired, to assess the
war on terror as to where we have been, where we are, and perhaps
most importantly, where we should be going. 2
In 2009, Matt and I wrote that Europe, and particularly the
European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"), seemed to have a much
sounder approach, based on established rule of law and human rights
law principles set forth in the European Human Rights Convention
("Convention"), than the U.S. in confronting most legal aspects of the
war on terror. We looked at case law developments involving
extraordinary renditions, military commissions, and related habeas
corpus proceedings to challenge them in connection with suspected
terrorist detentions, warrantless electronic surveillance, official
complicity in aiding human rights violations - including torture against
terrorist suspects by overseas governments and their officials - state
secrets as a basis to bar legal claims, and the marked U.S. court
tendency to dismiss legal claims against the U.S. and its officials on
1. The University of Montana. The Author has been the General Counsel and an
adjunct law faculty member at The University of Montana since 1994. His academic
specialty areas include international law, which he has been teaching at The University of
Montana Law School for the past 18 years. The views expressed herein are solely the
author's personal ones and not attributable to The University of Montana.
2. David Aronofsky & Matthew Cooper, The War on Terror and International
Human Rights: Does Europe Get It Right?, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 567 (2009).
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various technical grounds. These developments were contrasted with
the ECHR decisions allowing lawsuits against European states to
proceed. We concluded that the U.S. should follow the European
approach of allowing lawsuits challenging alleged violations of basic
rights of terrorist suspects to be decided on their legal merits. In
retrospect and based on a review of U.S. and European case decisions
since publication of our article, nothing has altered my position.
Before getting into reasons, however, I think it is appropriate here
to cite some of Professor Nanda's own legal views regarding the War on
Terror as it has progressed since the September 11, 2001 tragedy
because he has, in many respects, been a voice for all of us in
identifying legal issues which matter. For example, in 2001 he
reminded us that international law is a fundamental weapon in waging
the war on terrorism and stated that "the war against terrorism will be
won only if concerted national action is taken . .. for that to happen, we
need to provide credible leadership that we can be proud of and we need
to take the moral high ground that will set an exemplary precedent."3
That same year, he also noted:
Among policy alternatives to combat terrorism, the use of
military force dominates the U.S. agenda today. The
implications of this are far-reaching. As historically
unprecedented as the challenges are, it would appear that
more creative approaches are urgently called for,
approaches that do justice to the multi-faceted character of
this problem. 4
Even more to the point, he cautioned:
The use of military force to combat terrorism must be seen
as a new powerful tool being wielded by the United States.
Having employed it first in Afghanistan and now in Iraq,
the US has been emboldened by its reception at home and
seemingly undaunted by criticism of it overseas. Its
implications are far-reaching, perhaps especially for the
integrity of the law itself.5
Time and circumstances proved Professor Nanda to be an accurate
prophet.
Professor Nanda studied the U.S. approach to waging the war on
terror as it continued after 9/11, and in 2006 he addressed the issue of
3. Ved Nanda, The Role of International Law in Combating Terrorism, 10 MICH.
STATE UNIV. -DETROIT COLL. L. J. INT'L L. 603, 608 (2001).
4. Ved P. Nanda, Foreword: Combating International Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y vi, x (2002).
5. Id. at ix.
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terrorist suspect detentions head-on by urging that the detainees "must
be treated humanely" and with "basic fairness."6 He captured the
sentiments of many by stating that those directing the U.S. war on
terror "must not lose sight of the need to strengthen international
human rights law and not even inadvertently dilute it."7
It is with Professor Nanda's foregoing thoughts in mind that we
now view where we have been, where we are, and where we ought to be
going with the U.S. war on terrorism.
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS
Matt and I sharply criticized the seeming U.S. judicial willingness
to condone extraordinary renditions by finding no viable cause of action
in U.S. courts to challenge them in Arar v. Ashcroft. After we published
our article, the Second Circuit reheard its prior decision en banc and a
sharply divided court reaffirmed its initial decision barring any legal
claim against U.S. officials or the government itself.8  The U.S.
Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal.9 Mr. Arar, the plaintiff, was
neither a U.S. citizen nor a U.S. permanent resident alien, thus
deferring for another day the question of whether U.S. citizens would
fare differently in challenging renditions. The Seventh Circuit recently
suggested an affirmative answer in a non-rendition overseas torture
case, Vance v. Rumsfeld,'0 but the Court recently vacated this three-
judge decision and granted en banc review in a development which
bodes ill for rendition case plaintiffs." Meanwhile, U.S. district courts
seem to follow Arar in rejecting rendition claims by any plaintiffs.12 In
addition, it now seems clear that suits against private, non-
governmental defendants participating in rendition are likewise barred
whenever plaintiffs require evidence available solely from classified
information to sustain them. 13
Meanwhile, the ECHR goes in a much different direction:
"[E]xtraordinary rendition, by its deliberate circumvention of due
6. Ved P. Nanda, Terrorism as an "Internal Conflict" Under the 1977 Geneva
Protocol: Defining "Enemy Combatant" and the International/Domestic Consequences, 14
MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 27, 34 (2006).
7. Ved P. Nanda, Introductory Essay: International Law Implications of the United
States' "War on Terror," 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 513, 537 (2009).
8. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 582 (2d. Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3409 (2010).
9. Id.
10. 653 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2011).
11. Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 10-1687, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct.
28, 2011).
12. See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 800 (D.S.C. 2011); AI-Zahrani v.
Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 112 (D.D.C. 2010).
13. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
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process, is anathema to the rule of law and the values protected by the
Convention."14 Although the Court recognized that sending suspected
terrorists to other countries is permissible, this can only be done when
there are strong, legally binding assurances by the sending and
receiving countries that all legal rights protected in the Convention will
be respected.15 As noted in our prior article, the ECHR has little
hesitation about granting rule of law primacy over security.
ENEMY COMBATANT HABEAS LITIGATION
As Matt and I pointed out in our prior article, the issues of enemy
combatants status and their detention conditions, including indefinite
detention status, has been one pitting the U.S. Government against the
mainstream of international law jurists' views.16  We expressed
concerns about the limited right of habeas corpus and its viability. Our
concerns proved well founded. In case after case since then, detainees
in Guantanamo and elsewhere have used habeas to no avail in their
efforts to challenge their detentions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, which now has exclusive jurisdiction over these detainee
habeas petitions, has proved a habeas legal graveyard, and its decisions
recently prompted a pair of commentators to accuse this Court of
"undermining" the right of meaningful habeas review.' 7 Another has
identified four individual judges on this Court who seem to steer these
cases to predetermined outcomes whenever at least two are on the same
judicial panel, making it impossible for detainee habeas petitioners to
prevail. 18 One specific category of cases involves the evidentiary
requirements to prove these petitioners belong in detention as either
supporters of, or persons who are part of, terrorist organizations like Al-
Qaeda, under a lax preponderance standard the D.C. Circuit has yet to
find unmet.19 This Court most recently reversed a lower court grant of
one detainee's habeas petition because federal executive branch actions
enjoy a "presumption of regularity" supposedly not considered by the
14. Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6, 114 (2010).
15. Id. 104-09.
16. The Military Commissions Act of 2009, enacted October 28, 2009, now refers to
such combatants as "alien unprivileged enemy belligerents" and "alien privileged enemy
belligerents" but this is a semantic change without any substantive difference - the
former face military commission trials and enjoy limited legal rights, while the latter get
prisoner of war status even though few detainees in U.S. military custody fall into this
category. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1802(6)-(7)(C), 123
Stat. 2190, 2574 (codified as 10 U.S.C.A. § 948(a) (West 2012)).
17. Jon Connolly & Marc D. Falkoff, Habeas, Informational Asymmetries, and the
War on Terror, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1361, 1393 (2011).
18. Stephen I. Viadeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L.REV.
1451, 1488-89 (2011).
19. See, e.g., Khan v. Obama. 655 F.3d 20, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Almerfedi v. Obama,
654 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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lower court even though the latter appeared to find ample basis to
overcome any such presumption. 20 These results in and of themselves
might not warrant serious criticisms given the small numbers of habeas
corpus writs granted by U.S. courts generally, but here the law is still
unclear about who may be lawfully detained under what status and
evidentiary circumstances. As Professor Chesney notes, "[T]he precise
boundaries of the government's detention authority remain unclear
despite the passage of more than nine years since the first post-9/11
detainees came into U.S. custody."21 Professor McNeal states it better:
"Counterterrorism detention policy in the United States is a mess." 2 2
This problem has likely just been exacerbated by President
Obama's December 31, 2011 signing of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2012, which now authorizes indefinite military
detentions of anyone, including U.S. citizens who are "part of or [have]
substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces ...
engaged in hostilities against the United States" or anyone who
commits a "belligerent act" against the U.S. or a U.S. ally regardless of
whether the detainee committed any such act on a battlefield and even
such act is committed in the United States. 23 The ACLU has described
President Obama's approval of the legislation as "a blight on his legacy
because he will forever be known as the president who signed indefinite
detention without charge or trial into law."2 4 There is more to say
below about the overall Obama approach to the war on terror and
military commissions.
One black letter legal rule regarding detention seems to be
emerging from these U.S. cases, namely that non-U.S. citizen and
nonresident alien detainees held outside U.S. jurisdiction lose their
right to sue even in the face of horrible atrocities such as those seen in
Abu Ghraib. 25 This includes suits against the government, government
officials, and contractors, with contractors having especially broad
immunity.26
20. Latifv. Obama, No. 10-5319, 2011 WL 5431524, at *7-8 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2011).
21. Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas
Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 864 (2011).
22. Gregory S. McNeal, The Status Quo Bias and Counterterrorism Detention, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 855, 855 (2011).
23. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§
1021(a)-(b)(2), 1022(a)(1)-(2)(B), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562-63 (2011).
24. President Obama Signs Indefinite Detention Bill into Law, ACLU (Dec. 31, 2011)
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/president-obama-signs-indefinite-detention-bill-law.
25. See Gul v. Obama, 652 F.3d 12, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762,
765-66, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
26. Al-Shimari v. CACI, Int'l Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir. 2011); Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); but see Dr.
Daniel Warner, Establishing Norms for Private Military and Security Companies, in this
book.
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The ECHR takes a tough approach contrary to U.S. detention cases
by concluding that permissible grounds for detention pursuant to the
Convention do "not include internment or preventive detention where
there is no intention to bring criminal charges within a reasonable
time."27 This rule applies regardless of where detainees are located
physically as long as they are within the custody of Convention state's
military or civilian authorities. 28 This straightforward approach makes
it difficult to see how any Convention state can lawfully turn over
someone it has detained to U.S. military commissions.
WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE
Another troubling legal aspect of the war on terror cited in our
prior article is the use of judicially unsupervised electronic surveillance.
We found especially problematic the unavailability of legal redress to
challenge the National Security Agency ("NSA") Terrorist Surveillance
Program, in essence giving free reign to U.S. national security agencies
to monitor international electronic communications. Since that time,
one federal appeals court has continued to block judicial access to
litigate whether such surveillance even occurred. 29 Another has only
recently upheld blanket immunity for U.S. telecommunications
companies which aid the government by providing the surveillance
means. 30 However, on a more positive legal note for plaintiffs in these
cases, two separate federal appellate courts have found that certain
organizations and individuals now have standing to challenge the
electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens outside the U.S. under the
current version of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"),
adopted in 2008, which requires judicial approval of such surveillance,
but does not require any particularized basis for granting such
approval. 31 Whether the award of standing will result in plaintiffs
winning these cases on their merits seems far from certain, however,
because the government still has a number of defenses (including the
"state secrets" argument discussed below) which appear likely to
preclude such a result.
In contrast to the surveillance wars in U.S. courts, the ECHR had
decided, in its 2008 Liberty decision shortly before we wrote our article,
that surveillance without close court supervision is legally
impermissible under the Convention. 32 Since that decision the ECHR
27. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 55, 1 100 (2011).
28. See id. 84-86.
29. Wilner v. NSA, 592 F.3d 60, 76 (2d Cir. 2009).
30. NSA Telecomm. Records Litig. v. AT&T Corp., No. 09-16676, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25949, at *5, 44 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2011).
31. Jewel v. NSA, No. 10-15616, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25951, at *26-27 (9th Cir.
Dec. 29, 2011); Amnesty Int'l v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 140 (2d Cir. 2011).
32. See Liberty v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2008).
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has again reviewed the practice on unchecked national security agency
surveillance with little or no court supervision. In a stronger
statement, the ECHR determined that even the threat of secret
surveillance pursuant to nonexistent or inadequate national laws was
enough to trigger ECHR jurisdiction in order to challenge the threat
under the Convention. 33 The ECHR also rejected the notion that
plaintiff ignorance of the surveillance should bar the action for lack of
legal injury by noting finding mere unchecked threat enough to sustain
the case. 34 The ECHR does not wholly dismiss secret surveillance in
the war on terror. In fact, it has upheld it as long as there are clearly
written laws which prescribe how and when it will be used, define
which categories of persons are susceptible to surveillance, and limit
the surveillance time and means to those "strictly necessary for
safeguarding democratic institutions."3 5  This approach seems far
preferable to the guessing game seen in the U.S., although the Amnesty
and Jewel cases noted above may well result in similar rulings.
POLITICAL QUESTION BARS TO LITIGATION & LIABILITY
Our prior article expressed concerns about U.S. court willingness to
apply the political question bar to litigation and liability against the
U.S. executive branch, even when basic rights are violated. Since then,
our concerns have proved valid as the political question doctrine has
shut down judicial review of executive branch decisions to bomb, kill,
and falsely accuse innocent people and businesses mistakenly identified
as terrorists. 36 The D.C. Circuit explains this with crystal clarity: "The
political question doctrine bars our review of claims that, regardless of
how they are styled, call into question the prudence of the political
branches in matters of foreign policy or national security
constitutionally committed to their discretion."37 Taken literally, this
means an executive branch official can exercise whatever the official
discretionarily determines is appropriate in the war on terror
regardless of the consequences, as long as there is a significant foreign
relations or national security aspect to the decision. In other words, the
lawyers who represent client victims of this war can simply drop their
cases and go home because quite probably no war on terror decisions
involving other countries are non-discretionary in nature.
The ECHR seemingly takes a different approach regarding
discretionary decisions in the war on terror:
33. Iordachi v. Moldova, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 (2009).
34. Id. 30.
35. Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, 153 (2010).
36. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 (D.D.C.
2011).
37. El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 842.
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[I]t would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal
discretion granted to the executive . . . to be expressed in
terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must
indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the
competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with
sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection
against arbitrary interference. . .38
The ECHR has indicated quite strongly that only the judicial
branch of government has the power to determine when executive
discretion has overreached at the expense of rights protected by the
Convention.39 It is unlikely that the ECHR would ever accept a
political question bar to judicial review.
STATE SECRETS AND UNDISCLOSED EVIDENCE
Matt and I took issue with U.S. judicial inability or unwillingness
to allow litigation by victims legally injured in the war on terror when
evidence in the case flowed from state secrets, even when these cases
have merit. We also expressed concern about how easily state secrets
could be claimed by the U.S. executive branch, which even cites the
doctrine to shield publicly available information, as seen in the 2007 El-
Masri decision. 40 Since that time, two other federal appellate courts in
different circuits have applied the state secrets doctrine to preclude
plaintiffs from pursuing their cases. 41 In addition to these state secrets
cases, other federal courts have refused to require disclosure of witness
identities and other material evidence used to support anti-terrorism
criminal convictions. 42 This means that even when terrorism cases
wind up in federal criminal court rather than military commissions, the
constitutional rights generally available in other criminal cases do not
necessarily apply in these.
The ECHR applies a different standard to evidence denial on
national security grounds. Although the ECHR recognizes the need, at
times, not to make all evidence used in terrorism cases available to
defendants, this need can be met only with great difficulties;
independent courts must be able to assess all evidence used in
particular cases, in consultation with legal counsel for defendants,
38. Kennedy, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, 94 (quoting Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 94).
39. A v. United Kingdom, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 173, 202 (2009).
40. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
41. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010); Doe v. Cent.
Intelligence Agency, 576 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2009).
42. United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Abu-
Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3062 (2011).
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before cases involving secret evidence can proceed. 43  Unlike U.S.
courts, the ECHR will readily reject convictions based on lack of access
to evidence rather than find reasons to sustain them. 44
MILITARY COMMISSIONS: ARE THEY LEGITIMATE?
Our prior article joined the large chorus of voices questioning the
legitimacy of military commissions in adjudicating many of the
detainees caught up in the war on terror. We praised the 2006 U.S.
Supreme Court Hamdan decision finding military commissions created
under a then-applicable federal stature invalid based on U.S.
constitutional and international law principles.45 We also suggested
that the Court's subsequent Boumediene decision recognizing
Guantanamo detainee habeas rights had left another legal question
mark hanging over legislatively created military commissions. 46
Congress nonetheless responded first to Hamdan by reconstituting the
commissions in 2006 to create their statutory basis; and again in 2009,
partly in response to Boumediene to set evidentiary parameters for both
civil court habeas proceedings and commission cases. 47 Congress again
acted last December to refine somewhat how commissions are to
function from this point forward.48 Based on this pattern of
congressional enactments, it seems clear the U.S. legislative branch,
with executive branch support, will insist on using military
commissions in the war on terror as long as the judicial branch allows
it.
Whether commissions are constitutionally viable will require yet
another U.S. Supreme Court decision, or two, to decide. Meanwhile,
opinions about whether they meet fundamental legal safeguards are
decidedly mixed as they now hear cases. Two recent commentators
with first-hand familiarity of commissions cases generally give the
commissions positive assessments, and one, Joshua Dratel, has written
a piece well worth reading because he raises points seldom discussed by
critics about how experienced civilian criminal defense counsel can
practice effectively once the cases get underway.49 Other commentators
deplore these commissions, citing serious ethical, evidentiary and
43. A, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 210 (2009); Sangeeta Shah, From Westminster to
Strasbourg: A and Others v United Kingdom, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 473, 483-86 (2009).
44. See A, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 25 (2009).
45. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
46. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
47. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190.
48. See Obama Signs NDAA, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
49. Keith A. Petty, Beyond the Court of Public Opinion: Military Commissions and
the Reputational Pull of Compliance Theory, 42 GEo. J. INT'L L. 303 (2011); Joshua L.
Dratel, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Military Commissions, 41 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1339 (2011).
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substantive rights issues, suggesting something akin to Star Chamber
justice.50 One military lawyer with actual case experience provides a
balanced perspective about the pros and cons of the commissions, before
ultimately concluding they should be abolished in favor of using U.S.
civilian courts.5 1 The negative critics conclude without exception that
these commissions lack validity under U.S. constitutional and
international law. Perhaps the harshest criticism of all to date comes
from a U.S. military lawyer who represents Guantanamo detainees,
when he cites "the legal theory underpinning Guantanamo and the
military commissions" as "an assault upon the structure of our form of
constitutional government" flowing directly from the architect of Nazi
Germany's legal system used to support the Holocaust.52
The ECHR would likely agree with the harshest commissions'
critics, given the continuous ECHR line of cases concluding that
military courts can never try civilian terrorist defendants fairly, or in a
manner consistent with Convention safeguards, because they fall too
far outside civilian judicial control. We cited the Kenar case in our
article to illustrate this legal point.53 Since that case, the ECHR has
had no military court decision, but a series of recent cases involving
British military activities in Iraq make clear that the Convention
applies to all aspects of these activities where civilian rights are
concerned. The British Government has yet to prevail in any of these
cases, arguing special military exigencies as a basis for ignoring
Convention rights. 54 Perhaps more to the point, the ECHR has strongly
suggested that countries bound by the Convention would violate it by
extraditing suspected terrorists in European detention to the U.S.,
absent assurances that they would not be tried by U.S. military
commissions. 55
50. James A. Cohen, Lawyering in a Vacuum, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1427 (2011);
Mark Denbeaux, et al., No-Hearing Hearings: An Analysis of the Proceedings of the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantanamo, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1231 (2011);
Shayana Kadidal, Confronting Ethical Issues in National Security Cases: The
Guantanamo Habeas Litigation, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1397 (2011); Carlissa Carson, Yes
We Can Revise the Current Military Commissions System, But Why?, 25 CONN. J. INT'L L.
389 (2010).
51. David J.R. Frakt, The Practice of Military Law in the Guantanamo Military
Commissions, 67 A.F. L. REV. 35 (2011); David J.R. Frakt, The Myth of Divided Loyalties:
Defending Detainees and the Constitution in the Guantanamo Military Commissions, 43
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 545 (2011).
52. Todd E. Pierce, The Guantanamo Facility at 10: An Assault on Our Constitu-
tional Government, The National Law Journal (Jan. 10, 2012).
53. Kenar v. Turkey, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 67215/01 (2007).
54. Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6 (2010); Al-Skeini v. United
Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 55721/07 (2011); Al-Sadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 61498/08 (2010).
55. Ahmad, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6, T1 117, 119.
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THE BUSH AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONS: IS THERE A MATERIAL
DIFFERENCE?
Professor Nanda minced no words in describing "there is broad
consensus that the Bush Administration's war on terror led to
violations of international human rights law as well as international
humanitarian law . . . both domestically and internationally." 5 6 Few
scholars would dispute this view, which does beg the question of
whether the Obama administration has done any better. The answer is
a qualified maybe. President Obama has apparently halted renditions,
torture, and secret detention facility use.5 7
However, despite Obama campaign promises to close Guantanamo,
the detainees are still there and their trials by military commissions of
dubious validity continue. To date no high or mid-level U.S. civilian or
military official has been convicted in civilian or military courts for
violating U.S. detainee rights, including officials tied to the infamous
Abu Ghraib prison. Contractors have also evaded legal accountability
in most cases because "no coherent recourse currently exists, either
domestically or internationally, that can hold PCMFs [Private Military
Contractor Firms] accountable for mistreatment."5 8 Although post-Abu
Ghraib legal review occurred during the Bush administration, there is
no reason to believe results would differ in the current one. These
results are stark regarding the military:
After exhaustive investigations, public fallout, and
internal recriminations, eleven enlistees were court-
martialed, convicted, and sentenced for their conduct at
Abu Ghraib. Their sentences ranged from a reduction in
rank and the loss of one-half of one month's pay to ten
years in prison. As for the officers who ran the Abu Ghraib
prison, only one, the lieutenant colonel who directed the
interrogation center, was charged with crimes relating to
the abuse and subsequent cover-up; he was cleared of all
charges but for one count of willfully disobeying an order
not to discuss the investigation. A few officers were
reprimanded and administratively punished for their
failures of leadership, including then-Brig. Gen. Janis
Karpinski, who lost her star, and Col. Thomas Pappas, who
was relieved of command, reprimanded, and fined. Not a
56. Nanda, supra note 7, at 536.
57. Manfred Nowak, Moritz Birk & Tiphanie Crittin, The Obama Administration and
Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
33, 43 (2011).
58. Huma T. Yasin, Playing Catch-Up: Proposing the Creation of Status-Based
Regulations to Bring Private Military Contractor Firms Within the Purview of
International and Domestic Law, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 411, 495 (2011).
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single officer, however, was court-martialed for failing to
stop the abuse of prisoners. In fact, Maj. Gen. Antonio M.
Taguba, the Army investigating officer whose report
revealed the extent of military crimes at Abu Ghraib,
damaged his own military career by completing such a
candid, hard-hitting report. 59
One former military prosecutor who also tried ICTY cases suggests
that the notion of command responsibility, used to try numerous high
level military officers for legal rights abuses, seems lacking. She
persuasively argues that
[a] command climate of zero tolerance for law of war
violations, where commanders have strong and targeted
incentives to prevent, detect, and punish abuses, would do
more than achieve the laudable goal of meeting our
obligations under international law. It would also
strengthen our military organization and better enable the
military to accomplish its missions.60
Obama administration Justice Department attorneys argue as
zealously as their Bush administration predecessors against allowing
war on terrorism victims legal redress in U.S. courts which, as seen
above, routinely accept the arguments. If anything, the Obama lawyers
have deepened the habeas legal quagmire since he took office. 61 Most
scholars assessing the Obama administration approach to the war on
terror have harshly criticized it.62 Despite the positive changes
President Obama has apparently brought about as noted above,
detainees can still be held incommunicado, military commissions
continue to try civilians under procedurally defective and ethically
problematic rules, detainees are still returned to countries where they
can be tortured, and in addition, investigations of past alleged torture
in the prior administration have apparently withered on the vine in
breach of U.S. Torture Convention obligations. 63 Although perhaps
some partisanship is expected from a senior Republican Senate staff
expert involved with war on terror legislation, one has difficulty
arguing with his conclusion that:
59. Elizabeth L. Hillman, Gentlemen Under Fire: The U.S. Military and "Conduct
Unbecoming,"26 LAW & INEQ. 1, 5 (2008).
60. Melissa Epstein Mills, Brass-Collar Crime: A Corporate Model for Command
Responsibility, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 25, 64 (2010).
61. E.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S.Ct. 997 (2011).
62. E.g., Nowak, Birk & Crittin, supra note 57.
63. Id. at 66.
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[o]ther than a relatively minor revamping of the military
commissions system, President Obama's pre-election
criticism of Bush administration policies and post-election
discussion of charting a new course in detention policy has
dissolved into paralysis and procrastination. Political
demagoguery and legitimate policy differences among
senators and congressmen create an environment
inhospitable to the development of consensus detention
legislation, but those obstacles could be overcome with
leadership from the President. Without that leadership,
though, detention policy has merely become a tool used by
those on both the political left and right for their own
electoral reasons. 64
Many would agree with Professor Welsh that indefinite
Guantanamo detentions lack legitimacy, yet nothing has been done to
stop them and the 2012 Defense Reauthorization Act ensures their
continuation.65 As Professor Miller notes in comparing Guantanamo
detentions to the World War II Korematsu case, President Obama's
claims of authority to maintain indefinite detentions "for many of the
remaining Guantanamo detainees, underscore . . . the likelihood that
the power he claims will, in Justice Jackson's dissenting words in the
most infamous detention case in our history, lie 'about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need."' 6 6 Professor Yin recently wrote; "[I]t
is now readily apparent that the Obama Administration is pursuing a
counterterrorism strategy . . . broadly consistent with that of the Bush
Administration." 67
As discussed above, the ECHR applies law rather than political
expediency in war on terror cases. The ECHR recognizes command
responsibility as customary international law to allow convictions of
those who fail to prevent subordinates' war crimes. 68 Our prior article
illustrated that the ECHR has long applied strict accountability on
Convention states to conduct thorough investigations of human rights
64. Walter E. Kuhn, The Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act: Detention Policy and
Detention Reality, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 221, 270 (2011).
65. David Welsh, Procedural Justice Post-9/11: The Effects of Procedurally Unfair
Treatment of Detainees on Perceptions of Global Legitimacy, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 261, 269-70
(2011).
66. Bruce Miller, No Virtue in Passivity: The Supreme Court and Ali Al-Marri, 33 W.
NEw ENG. L. REV. 697, 753 (2011) (referencing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
246 (1944) (Jackson, J. dissenting)).
67. Tung Yin, Broken Promises or Unrealistic Expectations?: Comparing the Bush and
Obama Administrations on Counterterrorism, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 465,
509 (2011).
68. Kononov v. Latvia, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, T 211 (2010).
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abuses and provide legal redress for violations. These legal obligations
continue.69 The ECHR has also emphasized that any alleged special
war on terror considerations cannot override Convention rights and
protections, in rejecting practices such as extraordinary rendition as
"anathema to rule of law and the values protected by the Convention." 0
The Obama Administration would do well to study ECHR case decisions
protecting basic legal rights and refusing to apply technicalities to
undermine them.
WHERE WE SHOULD Go FRoM HERE IN THE WAR ON TERROR
The ECHR approach to most aspects of the war on terror discussed
above should probably be adopted. Here is what the future likely
portends if this happened.
First, the U.S. would not engage in extraordinary renditions or
similar activities without serious legal consequences. At a minimum,
victims of such renditions would have an automatic right to legal
redress and compensation in U.S. courts, or alternatively, some form of
U.S. administrative tribunal empowered by a future U.S. law could set
reasonable compensation amounts. In addition, those engaged in
rendition acts would be subject to criminal liability. If a particular
rendition were deemed essential under exigent national security
circumstances, a U.S. presidential pardon avoids the criminal exposure
problem. Once rendition victims have access to appropriate
compensation, suing private individuals and companies, such as
Jeppesen, might not be needed and complicated state secrets problems
are avoided.
Second, the U.S. should clarify the habeas corpus for Guantanamo
detainees in a manner consistent with U.S. constitutional and
international law. The ECHR approach requiring all detainees to be
scheduled promptly for criminal prosecutions and trials subject to the
full panoply of defendant constitutional rights meets these concerns. In
the process of cleaning up the detainee habeas legal mess, we should
also define detainee status much more precisely so detainees can know
with certainty why they are detained. Moreover, because Congress
contributed to this mess legislatively, Congress might consider using
new legislation to define some specific criteria for detainee habeas
corpus writs.
Third, warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens and permanent
resident aliens in their person and in their communications needs tight
legal rein by U.S. federal courts. The way to accomplish this is through
specified probable cause for surveillance approved by courts. Even if
69. Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6 (2010); Astamirova v. Russia, 51
Eur. Ct. H.R. 43 (2009).
70. Ahmad, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. SE6, T 114.
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U.S. citizens and resident aliens are taken care of, however, this does
not solve the more complicated issue of protecting basic privacy rights
of others as a human right. The ECHR does not distinguish between
citizens or resident aliens on the one hand, and nonresident aliens on
the other, in limiting such surveillance under the Convention.71 The
U.S. should assess how to protect all privacy rights without
compromising national security.
Fourth, the U.S. political question bar to litigation and liability
should be disallowed in cases involving basic legal rights violations.
This is not to say that litigants deserve automatic standing to sue
because they must still demonstrate tangible legal injury, but when
they do so their lawsuits should proceed.
Fifth, the use of state secrets and undisclosed evidence in all war
on terror criminal cases should either cease altogether or face
substantial curtailment. The U.S. Government seems able to get quite
a few convictions in terrorism-related cases without any apparent need
to resort to these flawed legal tools. Facing one's accusers and
witnesses who support them reflects a bedrock principle of U.S.
constitutional law, as the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed. 72 This has already become such a serious problem that rather
than face the prospect of numerous detainee acquittals, the government
has found it necessary or desirable to release hundreds of Guantanamo
detainees without charging them. 73 Although these releases might well
suggest the problem is now self-correcting, nothing precludes
widespread detentions from recurring in the future and the detainees
still at Guantanamo have yet to see much of the evidence needed to
defend themselves. On a related note, either Congress or the U.S.
Supreme Court should overturn the D.C. Circuit Court decision barring
Confrontation Clause application in detention habeas proceedings
because otherwise, detainees may have no way to bring a meaningful
habeas writ for lack of available evidence to support it.74
Sixth, military commissions should be eliminated except in cases
involving non-US military personnel as defendants. In this regard the
ECHR view that military courts can never ensure fair trials for civilians
has no persuasive counter-argument. The fact that a growing number
of current and former military lawyers with direct Guantanamo case
experience now view commissions' elimination as contrary to core U.S.
71. Liberty v. United Kingdom, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2008).
72. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
73. Welsh, supra note 65, at 283-84.
74. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1814 (2011).
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constitutional and international law principles makes the elimination
case a legal cinch.
Seventh, President Obama should keep all his campaign promises.
The U.S. is the star actor on the world stage as a nation which once led
the world in rule of law adherence. The Bush administration opted to
sacrifice this role after 9/11 and it should not be forgotten that
President Obama won his election in no small part because of his
campaign promises to regain it. As seen above, the differences between
the Bush and Obama administrations are not legally sufficient, and the
recent 2012 Defense Authorization Act reestablishing indefinite
detentions takes the U.S. in the wrong direction.
Finally, there should be legal accountability once and for all for
U.S. military and civilian personnel, as well as private party
accomplices, who choose not to play by the rules of respecting basic
individual legal rights in the future. What is done may now already be
done, but the ECHR requirement of competent and thorough
investigations of all significant legal rights abuses, accompanied by
meaningful legal remedies when these abuses are found, is one the U.S.
is long overdue to adopt. The imposition of command responsibility on
U.S. political and military leadership could fix most of these problems,
and if the day ever comes when the U.S. loses a military conflict we may
well find it imposed by others.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
The U.S. war on terror has created many casualties. Perhaps the
greatest casualty of all is a loss of the core rule of law focus which
differentiated the U.S. from so many other countries on the global stage
decades before this war began. In order to win it, the U.S. must regain
its leadership in not only advocating, but practicing rule of law
principles predicated on respect for, and protecting, basic individual
rights. As Professor Nanda accurately wrote, the war on terror must
"be fought in the realm of ideas."75 In doing so, the United States "must
scrupulously follow principles of international law." 76 Following
Professor Nanda's sage counsel here will bring permanent victory to the
endeavor.
75. Ved Nanda, Terrorists Are Here, and Are Waiting, DENVER POST, Sept. 24, 2009,
available at http://www.denverpost.com/ci_13404545?IADID=Search-www.denverpost.
com-www.denverpost.com.
76. Ved Nanda, We Must Adhere to International Law, DENVER POST, Jan. 15, 2009,
available at http://www.denverpost.com/ci_11454961.
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